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Abstract. The cryptographic protocol of coin tossing consists of two parties, Alice
and Bob, that do not trust each other, but want to generate a random bit. If the parties
use a classical communication channel and have unlimited computational resources, one
of them can always cheat perfectly. Here we analyze in detail how the performance of a
quantum coin tossing experiment should be compared to classical protocols, taking into
account the inevitable experimental imperfections. We then report an all-optical fiber
experiment in which a single coin is tossed whose randomness is higher than achievable
by any classical protocol and present some easily realisable cheating strategies by Alice
and Bob.
PACS numbers: 42.50.-p,42.50.Ex
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1. Introduction
The cryptographic protocol of coin tossing introduced by Blum [1] consists of two
parties, Alice and Bob, that do not trust each other, but want to generate a
random bit. If the parties use a classical communication channel and have unlimited
computational resources, one of them can always cheat perfectly. But what if they
use a quantum communication channel? Because of its conceptual importance and
potential applications, quantum coin tossing was already envisaged by Bennett and
Brassard in their seminal paper on quantum cryptography [2]. Later works showed that
perfect quantum coin tossing is impossible [4, 5, 6], but that imperfect protocols exist
[7, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11] that perform better than any classical protocol.
Work on quantum coin tossing distinguishes between “weak coin tossing” and
“strong coin tossing”. In weak coin tossing Alice and Bob have antagonistic goals:
Alice wants the coin to be heads, say, whereas Bob wants the coin to come out tails.
Good quantum protocols for weak coin tossing exist, although they seem very difficult
to implement[11]. In strong coin tossing Alice and Bob both want the coin to be
perfectly random. Quantum protocols that perform better at strong coin tossing than
any classical protocol exist[9, 10] and come close to the known upper bound (for the
original unpublished proof of the upperbound, see[6]; published proofs can be found in
[12, 13]).
Quantum coin tossing itself is just one example of several interesting tasks that
two parties which do not trust each other can achieve if they share a quantum
communication channel, but cannot achieve if they use a classical communication
channel. Other examples include multiparty coin tossing[12] and weak forms of string
committment[14, 15]. The no go theorems mentioned above [4, 5, 6] rule out most other
applications, except if one adds additional assumptions such as bounding the size of
quantum memories[16].
Recently two works [17, 18] have experimentally studied optical implementations
of quantum coin tossing. However the experiment of ref. [17] suffered from important
photon loss which made it difficult to assess how the experiment worked when tossing
a single coin. This was circumvented, as in [18], by addressing string flipping, i.e. the
problem where the parties try to toss a string of coins rather than a single one. These
works were however carried out without realizing that good classical protocols exist for
string flipping, see e.g. [19] for a presentation of such protocols.
In the present work we go back to the conceptually simpler problem of tossing a
single coin, and report an experiment in which a single coin is tossed whose randomness
is higher than achievable by any classical protocol. We begin by discussing in detail
how the results of such a coin tossing experiment should be compared with classical
protocols in view of the inevitable imperfections that will occur in any experimental
realisation. Coin tossing in the presence of noise was already studied in [20], but with
the emphasiz on applications to string flipping, whereas here we are concerned with
tossing a single coin. We then present the experimental implementation, which follows
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closely the earlier work of [18], and present some easily realisable cheating strategies by
Alice and Bob.
2. Formulation of the problem
A protocol for coin tossing consists in a series of rounds of (classical or quantum)
communication at the end of which the parties decide on an outcome. The outcome
can be either a decision that the coin has the value c = 0 or c = 1, or it can be that
the protocol aborts, in which case we say that c =⊥. Note that because the rounds of
(quantum or classical) communication are sequential, it is logically possible for Alice to
choose one output x, and for Bob to chose another output y. For the sake of generality
it is convenient to take this into account and to denote by
pxy = Probability that in an honest execution of the
protocol Alice outputs x and Bob outputs y,
where x, y ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
We will say that a protocol is correct, if, when both parties are honest, at the end
of the protocol they agree on the outcome, and that the results c = 0 and c = 1 occur
with equal probability: p00 = p11 = (1 − p⊥⊥)/2. This formulation takes into account
that because of experimental imperfections, the outcome c =⊥ may occur even when
both parties are honest.
The aim of a cheater is to force the outcome of the coin tossing protocol. We denote
by
p∗y = Probability that a dishonest Alice can force an
honest Bob to output y
px∗ = Probability that a dishonest Bob can force an
honest Alice to output x
An alternative notation often used in the litterature is the bias ǫ which is related to our
notation by
ǫA = max
y
(p∗y − 1
2
)
ǫB = max
x
(px∗ − 1
2
) (1)
The bound due to Kitaev [6, 12, 13] states that either ǫA or ǫB is greater or equal to 1/
√
2.
The best known protocol for strong coin tossing due to Ambainis has ǫA = ǫB = 1/4.
In our experimental implementation, as we will see later, we will be concerned by a
protocol which in the terminology of [10] has “ρ0 and ρ1 both pure”. For such protocols
it is proven in [10] that ǫ2A + ǫ
2
B ≥ 1/4.
In the appendix we prove the following (which generalises a result of [6] when
p⊥⊥ = 0):
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Lemma 1: For any correct classical coin tossing protocol with three outcomes 0, 1,⊥ we
have:
(1− p0∗)(1− p∗1) ≤ p⊥⊥ , (2)
(1− p1∗)(1− p∗0) ≤ p⊥⊥ . (3)
Note that if p⊥⊥ = 0 these inequalities imply that either p0∗ = 1 or p∗1 = 1, and
that either p1∗ = 1 or p∗0 = 1, thereby showing that classical coin tossing is impossible.
When p⊥⊥ 6= 0 a cheater can no longer necessarily force the outcome he wants. In the
supplementary material we show that there exist classical protocols that saturate either
one of equations (2) or (3), and that there exist classical protocols that come close to
saturating both equations (2) and (3).
In view of Lemma 1, it is natural to quantify the quality of quantum coin tossing
experiments by the following merit function:
M = (1− p∗0)(1− p1∗)
2
+
(1− p∗1)(1− p0∗)
2
− p⊥⊥ (4)
which has the following properties:
(i) Positivity of probabilities implies −1 ≤M ≤ +1
(ii) For any classical protocol we have M≤ 0
(iii) An ideal protocol would have M = 1.
The interpretation of the merit function is most obvious in the weak coin tossing scheme
wherein Alice wins if Bob outputs 1 while Bob wins if Alice outputs 0 because then the
term (1 − p∗1)(1 − p0∗) is the product of how often a dishonest Alice cannot force a
win times how often a dishonest Bob cannot force a win (and similarly for the term
(1− p∗0)(1− p1∗)). The better the protocol, the larger these terms.
As illustration let us compute the value ofM for different protocols. The bound due
to Kitaev states with precision, see [12], that p∗1p1∗ ≥ 1/2 and p∗0p0∗ ≥ 1/2. Inserting
this into eq . (4) shows that for all quantum protocols, M≤ (1− 1/√2)2 ≃ 0.086. For
Ambainis’s protocol [9] for instance we have M = 1/16 = 0.0625.
3. Experimental Implementation
3.1. The Protocol
Our implementation of quantum coin tossing uses the following protocol:
(i) Alice chooses a ∈ {0, 1} at random. She prepares state ψa, where the two possible
states are non orthogonal: |〈ψ1|ψ0〉| = cos θ > 0. She sends ψa to Bob.
The states ψ0,1 will be taken to be coherent states of light of amplitude α and
opposite phase:
|ψ0〉 = |+ α〉 , |ψ1〉 = | − α〉 (5)
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which implies that
cos2 θ = |〈ψ1|ψ0〉|2 = |〈−α|+ α〉|2 = e−4α2 . (6)
In the notation of [10] we thus have ρ0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0| and ρ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| both pure.
Also note that ρ0 6= ρ1 prevents from cheating strategies based on entanglement
[3, 4].
(ii) Bob chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random. He tells the value of b to Alice.
(iii) Alice tells Bob the value of a.
(iv) Bob carries out a measurement which projects onto ψa or onto the orthogonal
space. If he finds that the state is not equal to ψa he aborts, and the outcome of
the protocol is ⊥. If he finds that the state is equal to ψa then the outcome of the
protocol is c = a⊕ b.
Bob’s measurement is carried out as follows: using a local oscillator (LO), he
displaces the quantum state by +α if a = 1 or by −α if a = 0. If Alice is honest
this results in the state becoming the vacuum state. To check this Bob then sends
the resulting state onto a single photon detector. If the detector clicks then Bob
assumes that Alice was cheating and he aborts: the outcome of the protocol is ⊥.
If the detector does not click, then Bob assumes that Alice is honest. (Note that
Bob’s measurement is similar in spirit to the method proposed in [21] for quantum
state tomography, but Bob’s task is simpler since he only needs to detect if Alice
is cheating, and not carry out the full state tomography).
3.2. Analysis in the absence of imperfections
We now study how the merit functionM depends on the details of the experiment. For
the sake of comparison we first look at the situation in the absence of imperfections.
First of all, in this case p⊥⊥ = 0.
Second, if Alice is dishonest she will send a fixed state |φ〉 at step 1 and at step
3 she will choose the value of a which will make her win the protocol, and then she
will hope that Bob will not abort. The probability that Bob will abort is given by the
overlap of |φ〉 with |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. One easily finds (see [20]) that Alice’s optimal choice
is |φ〉 = N(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉) where N a normalization constant, yielding the optimal values:
p∗0 = p∗1 =
1
2
+
|〈ψ1|ψ0〉|
2
=
1
2
+
cos θ
2
. (7)
Third, if Bob is dishonest, he will measure the state sent by Alice at step 2 so as to
try to find out whether it is ψ0 or ψ1, and he will then choose the value of b according to
the result of his measurement. For the optimal measurement the probability that Bob
wins is
p0∗ = p1∗ =
1
2
+
√
1− |〈ψ1|ψ0〉|2
2
=
1
2
+
sin θ
2
. (8)
The maximal value of the merit function Mmax = (1−1/
√
2)2
4
≃ 0.021 occurs when
cos(θ) = sin(θ) = 1/
√
2, corresponding to α2 = 0.17. Note that this is the maximum
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value for protocols which in the terminology of Spekkens and Rudolph [10] fall in the
category “ρ0 and ρ1 both pure”.
3.3. Analysis in the presence of imperfections
To obtain estimates on p∗c, pc∗ and p⊥⊥, and hence to estimate M, in the presence of
imperfections requires that we make assumptions on how the experiment is carried out.
The parameter, p⊥⊥, which we also call the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), can
easily be measured experimentally by tossing a large number of coins with Alice and
Bob both following their honest strategy.
3.3.1. Bob is dishonest When Bob is dishonest his cheating strategy is, as before, to
estimate before step 2 the state |ψa〉 prepared by Alice so as to correctly guess the
value of a. How do experimental imperfections, and in particular the limited visibility
V of interferences affect Bob’s success probability pc∗? To analyse this note that the
state Alice sends to Bob is a short laser pulse of known intensity which is then strongly
attenuated. Under strong attenuation all quantum states tend towards mixtures of
coherent states (see e.g. [18]). Thus we can assume that the states prepared by Alice
are coherent states of known intensity α2. These coherent states are not precisely known
to Alice. However it is not difficult to show that if two coherent states have intensity α2,
their scalar product is lower bounded by |〈ψ1|ψ0〉| ≥ e−2α2 . Bob’s cheating probability
can then be bounded, as in equation (8), by the scalar product of the two states prepared
by Alice:
pc∗ =
1
2
+
√
1− |〈ψ1|ψ0〉|2
2
≤ 1
2
+
√
1− e−4α2
2
. (9)
3.3.2. Alice is dishonest When Alice is dishonest we suppose that she can prepare an
arbitrary state just in front of Bob’s laboratory, and then send it to Bob. How do the
imperfections in Bob’s laboratory affect p∗c? To quantify this Bob could carry out a
complete tomography of his measurement apparatus, and based on the results compute
what is Alice’s best cheating strategy. Here we will make a simple estimate based on
easily accessible parameters.
First of all let us consider the effects of the attenuation AT during transmission
between Alice and Bob’s laboratories, of the attenuation AB in Bob’s apparatus, and of
the efficiency η of his detector. We take these parameters into account by analysing a
fictitious system in which Bob’s apparatus is replaced by a lossless apparatus, and all the
attenuation is under Alice’s control, i.e. ηfict = 100%, AfictB = 1, and A
fict
T = ATABη.
This replacement can only help a cheating Alice. In the fictitious system the state sent
by an honest Alice is | ± αfictB 〉 = | ± α
√
ATABη〉.
Second we analyse the effect of finite visibility on the performance of the fictitious
system just described. Because of the finite visibility, Bob will not be making a
projection onto the state | ± αfictB 〉, but onto slightly different states. We make the
Experimental quantum tossing of a single coin 7
C
D1 D2
A
PB
S
D
FM
C1
L
PCM
PCM
PBS
C2
Bob’s laboratory Alice’s laboratory
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ΦΑ 
Figure 1. Experimental setup: L, picosecond laser; D1, main photon counter;
D2, auxiliary photon counter; C1, 50/50 coupler; A, attenuator; ΦB Bob’s phase
modulator; PCM, polarization controller; PBS, polarizing beam splitter; C2, 80/20
coupler; PD, photodiode; ΦA, Alice’s phase modulator; FM, Faraday mirror.
assumption that Bob’s apparatus acts as a passive linear optical system. This implies
that the true states onto which Bob projects are slightly modified coherent states
| ± αfictB + δ±〉. The deviations due to δ± give rise to the optical contribution to the
QBER:
QBERopt =
(
|δ+|2 + |δ−|2
)
/2 = q|αfictB |2 , (10)
where q, the QBER per photon, can be related to the visibility V of interferences by
q ≃ (1−V )/2. (Note that in addition to QBERopt, there is another contribution to the
QBER due to the dark counts of the detectors. The total QBER is the sum of these
two contributions: QBER = QBERopt +QBERdk.)
The distance between the two states onto which Bob projects is given by
|(+αfictB + δ+)− (−αfictB + δ−)|2
≥ 4|αfictB |2 − 4|αfictB ||δ+ − δ−| = 4|αfictB |2(1− 2
√
q) .
(11)
Inserting this into equation (7) gives
p∗c ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
exp
[
−ABATη (1− 2√q)α2
]
. (12)
Thus the effect of the imperfections is to replace α2 by and effective attenuated intensity
ABATη
(
1− 2√q
)
α2.
3.4. Experimental results
Our experimental setup, depicted in Fig. 1, based on the plug and play system developed
for long distance quantum key distribution [22], is very similar to the one described in
[18]. It consists of an all-fiber (standard SMF-28) passively balanced interferometer,
and is therefore well suited to long distance quantum communication. The protocol
begins with Bob producing a short (300 ps) intense laser pulse at λ = 1.55µm (id300
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from idQuantique). The pulse is split in two by the coupler C1 with equal reflection
and transmission coefficients 50%. The two pulses are delayed one with respect to the
other by 134ns. The pulses are then recombined on a polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
and sent to Alice. The pulse that propagated along the long arm of the interferometer
is strongly attenuated and will play the role of signal. The pulse that propagated along
the short arm will play the role of local oscillator (LO). Upon receiving the pulses, Alice
splits off part of them using the coupler C2 and sends this to a photodiode that triggers
her electronics. At Alice’s site the pulses are further attenuated by the different optical
elements. They are reflected by the Faraday mirror. And Alice randomly chooses which
phase ΦA = 0, π to put on the signal pulse using her phase modulator. The signal
Alice sends back to Bob is thus the coherent state | ± α〉 with average photon number
|α|2 = 0.27.
When the pulses come back to Bob’s site, they are sent along the short and long
arm of the interferometer by the PBS and interfere at coupler C1. In front of the PBS is
a delay line belonging to Bob which ensures that after the pulses enters Bob’s laboratory
he bluehas the time to send to Alice the value of the bit b and then receive from her the
value of a. In our experiment the fiber pigtails of the PBS are sufficient to realize the
delay. Upon receiving the value of a, Bob puts the corresponding phase ΦB = aπ on the
LO. This ensures that there should be destructive interference at the output port that
goes to the circulator and then to detector D1 (id200 from idQuantique). If detector
D1 registers a click, Bob aborts. If it does not click, the outcome of the coin toss is
c = a ⊕ b. The other output of coupler C1 is monitored by detector D2, although this
is not directly used in the experiment.
There are in fact two security loopholes in this experiment. The first arises because
Alice does not know the intensity of the signal pulse she attenuates before sending it
back to Bob. Thus in principle Bob could send her a more intense state than expected,
which would mean that the scalar product of the states prepared by Alice would be
smaller than expected. The second security loophole arises because Bob does not know
the intensity of the pulse he uses as LO. Thus in principle Alice could send Bob the
vacuum state, both in the signal and LO, and cheat perfectly. Both loopholes could be
closed by having Alice (Bob) monitor the intensity of the signal (LO) before she (he)
attenuates it. This was not realised in the present setup because the laser pulses used
were not intense enough, but would be possible using more intense or longer laser pulses
as in [18], or by using an isolator combined with an amplitude modulator as in [24].
3.4.1. Both parties are honest As mentioned above, we performed the experiment
with |α|2 = 0.27. In a typical series 10000 coins were tossed, and we obtained 5066
occurrences of c = 1, 2 occurrences of c =⊥, the other outcomes being c = 0 (which
is consistent with the statistical uncertainty which should be of order
√
5000 = 70).
However we insist that the protocol can be used to toss a single coin.
We estimate the merit function as follows. The abort probability is estimated by
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tossing a large number (1.5 105) of coins with Alice and Bob both honest:
p⊥⊥ ≃ 1.40± 0.37 10−4 . (13)
where the error comes from statistical uncertainty.
The transmission losses are assumed to be negligible, AT = 1, as both parties are
separated by a few meters of optical fiber. Bob’s detector D1 has a η = 10% quantum
efficiency. It is gated using a 2.5 ns gate leading to a dark count probability of 4.7 10−5.
The attenuation of the signal in the optical elements of Bob’s laboratory has been
measured to be AB ≃ −6 dB (which includes the 3 dB losses at coupler C1 where the
signal and the LO interfere). Visibilities, as measured using an intense signal, were at
least 99.0% (corresponding to q = 5 10−3). By inserting these parameters in equations
(9) and (12) we obtain upper bounds for p∗c and pc∗:
p∗c ≤ 0.9971 and pc∗ ≤ 0.906 (14)
leading to the lower bound for the merit function:
M≥ 1.33 10−4 . (15)
This bound may seem very small. Its value is roughly explained by noting that
the maximal value in the absence of imperfections is Mmax = 0.021. The main source
of imperfections are the efficiency of the detectors (10 dB) and the losses in Bob’s
apparatus (6 dB). Thus we should reduce the attainable value of M by a factor 40,
yielding approximately equation (15). This argument shows that the simplest way to
improve the experiment would be to use a more efficient detector. It also shows that
the value ofM is rather robust against small variations of the experimental parameters.
We have computed that we could keepM positive while increasing losses between Alice
and Bob to AT ≃ 4.4 dB (more than 20 km of SMF-28 fiber), all other parameters being
kept constant.
3.4.2. Bob is dishonest In order to cheat Bob must estimate the state |ψa〉 prepared
by Alice so as to correctly guess the value of a before sending the value of b. We
implemented a simple cheating strategy in which Bob always applies ΦB = 0 on the LO.
If detector D1 clicks Bob assumes that Alice chose a = 1, whereas if D1 does not click
he assumes a = 0. Implementing this strategy yielded the value p1∗ = 0.505. This very
low value is due to the small values of η and AB. Note that a much better cheating
strategy, but which was impossible to implement in our laboratory, would be for Bob
to carry out a homodyne measurement and measure the quadrature that gives him the
best estimate of a.
3.4.3. Alice is dishonest As discussed above, when Alice is dishonest her best strategy
is to send a fixed state |φ〉 = N(|+α〉+ | −α〉) to Bob. After receiving b she then sends
the value of a that makes her win the coin toss and hopes that Bob will not abort. In
practice we implemented a strategy where Alice always sends |+ α〉. Even though this
strategy is very basic, it leads to p∗c = 0.9956, which is very close to the theoretical
maximum equation (14).
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4. Conclusion
In conclusion we have studied in detail how the performance of quantum coin tossing
protocols in the presence of imperfections should be compared to classical protocols.
We then reported on a fiber optics experimental realisation of a quantum coin tossing
protocol. Our analysis shows that in this realisation the maximum success cheating
probabilities for Alice and Bob are respectively 0.9971 and 0.906 when experimental
imperfections are taken into account, which is still better than achievable by any classical
protocol. We implemented this protocol using an all-optical fiber scheme and tossed a
coin whose randomness is higher than achievable by any classical protocol. Finally we
implemented simple realisable cheating strategies for both Alice and Bob.
After the present work was completed, we learned of a recent proposal specially
designed for carrying out quantum coin tossing in the presence of losses[23]. Obviously
taking into account losses, in particular those that occur in Bob’s apparatus, was an
important consideration when choosing and analysing the protocol reported here. The
protocol reported in [23] seems more tolerant to loss then ours. Once the effect of other
imperfections (such as finite visibility of interference fringes) are taken into account, it
could be compared to ours using the merit function M introduced above.
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Appendix
Here we provide bounds on the performance of classical coin tossing protocols when
there is some probability that the protocol aborts when both parties are honest. We
also show that there exist classical protocols that attain these bounds. We use the
notation and terminology introduced in the main text. The idea of the following result
is to analyse the performance of a classical protocol with 3 outcomes (i.e. a classical
protocol in which the parties try to toss a trit.).
Lemma 1: For any correct classical coin tossing protocol with three outcomes 0, 1,⊥
we have:
(1− p0∗)(1− p∗1) ≤ p⊥⊥ , (A.1)
(1− p1∗)(1− p∗0) ≤ p⊥⊥ . (A.2)
Proof of Lemma 1. We need to introduce some notation.
The protocol consists of K rounds of communication, labeled j = 1, . . . , K.
Denote by uj the possible states of the protocol at round j.
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Denote by w(uj) the probability of reaching state uj at round j in an honest
execution of the protocol.
Denote by w(uj+1|uj) the probability that in an honest execution, the protocol will
be in state uj+1 at round j + 1 if it is in state uj at round j.
Denote by p∗y(uj) the maximum probability that if Alice is dishonest and Bob is
honest, then Alice can force Bob to output y at the end of the protocol if the state at
round j is uj.
Denote by px∗(uj) the maximum probability that if Bob is dishonest and Alice is
honest, then Bob can force Alice to output x at the end of the protocol if the state at
round j is uj.
Introduce the quantity Tj defined by
Tj(x, y) =
∑
uj
w(uj)(1− px∗(uj))(1− p∗y(uj))
Note that if we take x = 0 and y = 1 the initial value (j = 1) of T is
T1(0, 1) = (1− p0∗)(1− p∗1), ie. the left hand side of eq. (A.1).
Note also that at roundK, when the protocol has ended, TK is equal to the sum over
the final states of the protocol in an honest execution of the product of the probabilities
that the output of Alice is not x and that the output of Bob is not y. Thus if we take
x = 0 and y = 1, then TK(0, 1) = p⊥⊥, ie. the right hand side of eq. (A.1).
To complete the proof we show that T is an increasing function of j, ie. Tj+1 ≥ Tj .
To this end suppose that at round j Bob will send some communication to Alice.
Then Alice cannot influence what will happen at round j, hence we have: p∗y(uj) =∑
uj+1 w(uj+1|uj)p∗y(uj+1).
Furthermore we have the trivial identity w(uj+1) =
∑
uj w(uj+1|uj)w(uj).
Finally we note that since it is Bob’s turn to talk at round j, we have 1−px∗(uj) ≤
1− px∗(uj+1) where uj+1 is any state at round j + 1 that can be obtained from state uj
at round j in an honest execution.
Inserting these identities into the definition of Tj , we obtained the desired inequality
Tj+1 ≥ Tj.
The proof of eq. (A.2) is similar.
End of proof of Lemma 1.
We have also obtained a partial converse of Lemma 1:
Lemma 2: There exists a correct classical protocol such that inequality (A.1) is saturated,
and there exists a correct classical protocol such that inequality (A.2) is saturated. There
also exists a correct classical protocol for which
(1− p0∗)(1− p∗1) = (1− p1∗)(1− p∗0) = p⊥⊥
2
. (A.3)
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us consider the following protocol:
Round 1: Alice excludes one of the outcomes. That is she chooses that the outcome
of the protocol will be either in {0, 1} (she has excluded ⊥), {0,⊥} (she has excluded 1)
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or {1,⊥} (she has excluded 0). She tells her choice to Bob. If she is honest she chooses
randomly among these three possibilities with a priori probabilities q01, q0⊥, q1⊥.
Round 2: Bob chooses which of the remaining two outcomes is the result of the
protocol. He tells Alice what is his choice. Thus for instance if Alice told him that the
outcome was in {0, 1}, Bob can choose that the outcome is either 0 or 1, but not ⊥. If he
is honest he chooses randomly among the two remaining possibilities with probabilities
q0|01, q1|01; q0|0⊥, q⊥|0⊥; q1|1⊥, q⊥|1⊥.
It is easy to check that, if the parties are honest, the probabilities are:
p00 = q0|01q01 + q0|0⊥q0⊥
p11 = q1|01q01 + q1|1⊥q1⊥
p⊥⊥ = q⊥|0⊥q0⊥ + q⊥|1⊥q1⊥ ; (A.4)
and that, if they are dishonest, the probabilities are:
p∗0 = max{q0|01, q0|0⊥}
p∗1 = max{q1|01, q1|1⊥}
p0∗ = q01 + q0⊥
p1∗ = q01 + q1⊥ . (A.5)
If we choose the parameters such that q0⊥ = q1⊥, q0|01 = q1|01 = 1/2, q0|0⊥ = q1|1⊥ ≥
1/2, then the protocol is correct and eq. (A.3) is verified.
And if we choose q0⊥ = 0 then we have p⊥⊥ = q⊥|1⊥q1⊥ = (1 − q1|1⊥)(1 − q01) and
p0∗ = q01, p∗1 = q1|1⊥ thus saturating eq. (A.1). Note that by adjusting the remaining
free parameter q0|01 one can make the protocol correct.
Similarly one can saturate inequality (A.2).
End of proof of Lemma 2.
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